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Abstract: Though it lacked a patent system until 1985, China is now the 
world leader in patent filings and litigation.  Despite the meteoric rise of the 
Chinese patent system, many in the West believe that it acts primarily to 
facilitate local protectionism rather than innovation.  Recent high-profile 
patent suits filed by relatively unknown Chinese firms against high-profile 
foreign tech companies, like Apple, Samsung, and Dell, have only added 
fuel to the fire.  Surprisingly, given how commonplace assertions of 
Chinese protectionism are, little empirical evidence exists to support them.  
This Article fills this gap in the literature by analyzing five years of data 
(2006–11) on patent suits litigated in courts with the fifty most active 
intellectual property (IP) dockets in China.  Among other things, we find 
that Chinese patent suits are highly concentrated in a handful of major 
urban jurisdictions—not in smaller inland cities where protectionism is 
most often alleged to take place—and also have rates of success and appeal 
very similar to those of US patent suits.  We also observe that foreign 
companies appear in Chinese patent suits most often as patent enforcers, not 
as accused infringers, and win their cases roughly as often as Chinese 
patentees.  Finally, we find that patents litigated in China are generally 
more than five years old at the time of assertion and frequently have family 
members issued by foreign patent offices.  Together, these findings 
contradict conventional wisdom that China’s patent system has been 
structured to benefit domestic industry at the expense of foreign firms.   
  
                                                 
*
Assistant Professor, Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara 
University School of Law.  
†
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Santa Clara University.  
‡
 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.  Thanks to 
Brian Wright and Zhen Lei for helpful comments on previous drafts of this Article.  Thanks 
also to participants at the 2015 IP Scholars Roundtable at Texas A&M School of Law, the 
University of San Francisco School of Law faculty workshop, and the Tsinghua 
University-U.C. Berkeley Workshop on Chinese Innovation and Intellectual Property 
Protection. We are particularly grateful to Luke Minford, Tim Smith, and Aria Tian of 
Rouse for providing the data on which this Article is based. 
2 Patent Litigation in China [23-Feb-16 
 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 2 
I. Patent Enforcement in China ..................................................................... 8 
II. Study Design .............................................................................................. 10 
A. Compiling a Database of Patent Suits .................................................. 10 
B. Litigant- and Patent-Specific Data ....................................................... 11 
III. Findings ...................................................................................................... 11 
A. By Jurisdiction ..................................................................................... 12 
B. By Litigant Characteristics ................................................................... 16 
C. By Patent Characteristics ..................................................................... 20 
IV. Analysis ...................................................................................................... 23 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 24 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, patent activity has exploded in China.  Since the mid-
1990s, the number of patent applications filed annually with China’s State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) has increased more than ninety-fold to a  
total of 928,177 in 2014,
1
 roughly 40 percent more than the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office received that year.
2
  China has also become 
the global leader in patent litigation with 9,680 suits filed in 2012,
3
 almost 
                                                 
1
 State Intell. Prop. Off., Monthly Statistics Reports, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/
statistics/ (last accessed Aug. 27, 2015) (reporting that in 2014 a total of 928,177 
“invention” patent applications were filed in China).  China, like most industrialized 
nations, recognizes three types of patents: invention patents, design patents, and utility 
models, see DOUGLAS CLARK, PATENT LITIGATION IN CHINA 31-32 (2011); however, in 
legal parlance, the term “patent” is typically used to refer exclusively to “invention” 
patents.  We follow the same convention in this paper.  All references infra to “patents” 
are, unless otherwise indicated, references to “invention patents.” 
2
 Compare id. with U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar 
Years 1963-2014, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last 
accessed Aug. 16, 2015) (reporting that in 2014 a total of 578,802 “utility” patent 
applications were filed in the U.S.). 
3
 Erin Coe, 5 Tips In The Art Of Patent War In China, LAW360, May 29, 2014, 
available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/PR_5TipsPatentWar_China_30may14.pdf 
(“Chinese courts have seen patent cases more than double over a four-year period, from 
4,422 filings in 2009 to 9,680 suits in 2012 . . . .”); see also YAN ZHAO, DLA PIPER, 
CHINA’S PATENT LITIGATION LANDSCAPE SHIFTS (2012), available at 
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2012/09/chinas-patent-litigation-
landscape-shifts/ (reporting that Chinese courts saw 7,819 new patent suits in 2011 and 
5,785 in 2010).  Though we were unable to obtain official statistics on the types of patents 
enforced in these cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that less than half (and perhaps as few 
as one-fifth) of these suits allege infringement of an invention patent.  Hon. Zhou 
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80 percent more than the total number filed in the United States.
4
 
Little evidence, however, links China’s patent boom to an actual 
increase in innovation.
5
  Rather, the rapid growth coincides with a major 
government campaign designed to increase domestic patent activity through 
incentives and political pressure.
6
  In contrast to American patent 
policymakers who have largely worked over the past decade to rein in some 
of the US patent system’s excesses,7 the Chinese government has been hard 
                                                                                                                            
Yunchuan, Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, Remarks at the 
Law in the Global Marketplace Conference at Santa Clara University School of Law (Nov. 
4, 2015). 
4
 Compare Coe, supra, with Lex Machina, https://lexmachina.com (last accessed June 
28, 2014) (reporting that a total of 5,411 patent suits were filed in the U.S. in 2012, 3,530 
in 2011, 2,714 in 2010, and 2,502 in 2009); see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We 
Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 773, 777-78 (2011) (comparing the number of patent suits filed in China and the U.S. 
in 2006 and 2008).   
5
 Many have questioned the quality of patents fueling China’s patent explosion.  See 
Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 79 (reporting that in response to 
government mandates, a “cottage industry has sprung up to produce patents of suspect 
value”); Markus Eberhardt, et al., What Can Explain the Chinese Patent Explosion?, CSAE 
Working Paper WPS/2011-15, at *4, *17 (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1965963 (finding that the growth of domestic patenting in 
China is largely attributable to a small number of Chinese IT equipment manufacturers and 
thus “most likely not” a “wider technological take-off among Chinese companies”); High 
Quantity, Low Quality: China’s Patent Boom, WANT CHINA TIMES, June 24, 2014, 
available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1102&MainCat
ID=11&id=20140624000124 (“China’s patent business is booming in terms of the number 
of applications, but the quality of patents is still poor, according to a Monday report to the 
top legislature.”). 
6
 These enticements include cash payments, tax breaks, better housing, and, for 
professors, increased credit toward tenure. Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, supra, at 78.  
Several recent studies link the growth in Chinese patenting to government subsidies like 
these and resulting gamesmanship on the part of patentees.  See Jianwei Dang & Kazuyuki 
Motohashi, Patent Statistics: A Good Indicator for Innovation in China? Patent Subsidy 
Program Impacts on Patent Quality, CHINA ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (estimating 
that government subsidy programs inflate Chinese patent counts by 30 percent); Zhen Lei 
et al., Patent Subsidy and Patent Filing in China, Working Paper (2012) (finding that, after 
the institution of government subsidies, Chinese patentees received the same number of 
patent claims, but spread those claims out over a larger number of individual issued 
patents); see also Patent Fiction, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21636100-are-ambitious-bureaucrats-fomenting-or-feigning-
innovation-patent-fiction (“[T]he explosion of patent filings is not the result of local 
researchers suddenly coming up with twice as many ingenious inventions: it is a response 
to a government order.”). 
7
 Since the mid-2000s, congressional interest in the US patent system has largely 
focused on reforms designed to eliminate low quality patents and reduce the level of patent 
litigation.  After years of debate, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 
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at work encouraging patent filings and enforcement among its citizens.  
These efforts, formally embodied in the China State Council’s National 
Intellectual Property Strategy (National IP Strategy), have the stated goal of 
raising China’s rank “among the advanced countries of the world in terms 
of the annual number of patents for inventions granted to . . . domestic 
applicants” and thereby “improv[ing] China’s capacity to create, utilize, 
protect and administer intellectual property” by 2020.8 
Though the Chinese government insists that the goal of the National IP 
Strategy is to “mak[e] China an innovative country,”9 many in the West 
contend that the practical impact—if not the true goal—of the policy shift is 
protectionism and thinly-veiled piracy rather than innovation.  According to 
a report prepared by the US Chamber of Commerce and the Global 
Intellectual Property Center, China’s patent reform efforts are part of “[a] 
refocus on state-industry monopolies” that is “increasingly perceived as 
anti-foreign” and “considered by many international technology companies 
to be a blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen 
before.”10  Suggestions are commonplace, even from US policymakers, that 
                                                                                                                            
2011. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in various sections of Title 35). 
Among other reforms, the AIA established a suite of powerful administrative procedures 
for challenging the validity of issued patents. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambawani, Inter 
Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 93 (2014) (comparing the new regime of 
“inter partes review” with the pre-AIA regime of “inter partes reexamination”).  In the last 
two terms, Congress has considered close to a dozen additional bills aimed at further 
reducing the cost and prevalence of patent litigation.  See Patent Progress, Patent 
Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, http://www.patentprogress.org/
patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last 
accessed Aug. 26, 2015) (summarizing patent reform bills introduced during the 113th and  
114th Congresses). 
8
 Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn021en.pdf [hereinafter, “National IP 
Strategy”]. 
9
 Id. 
10
 JAMES MCGREGOR, CHINA’S DRIVE FOR INDIGENOUS INNOVATION: A WEB OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 4-5 (2010), available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/legacy/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CHINA 
STRATEGY: REFINING YOURS COULD OPEN UP DOORS 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/publications/assets/gyb-63-china-
strategies.pdf (“In 2010, surveys by both the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) 
in Shanghai and the US-China Business Council (USCBC) pointed to perceived 
protectionism, lack of protection for IP rights, and struggles with the evolving regulatory 
environment”).  See also Mike Masnick, China’s Patent Strategy Isn’t About Innovation; 
It’s an Economic Weapon Against Foreign Companies, TECH DIRT, Jan. 4, 2011, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110102/15230512491/chinas-patent-strategy-isnt-
about-innovation-its-economic-weapon-against-foreign-companies.shtml; DANNY 
FRIEDMANN, CHINA’S NATIONAL IP STRATEGY 2008 (2008), http://duncanbucknell.com/
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the patenting push is an attempt to whitewash and legitimize what, in 
essence, remains a system built on piracy of foreign inventions.
11
   
Western complaints about China’s patent surge generally take two 
forms.  First, many allege that Chinese patents simply crib inventions 
previously made elsewhere.
12
  Recent, headline-grabbing patent suits filed 
by relatively unknown Chinese firms against high-profile foreign 
technology companies have added fuel to this fire.
13
  Apple has been sued 
for allegedly infringing Chinese patent rights that cover virtual assistant 
                                                                                                                            
2008/09/11/chinas-national-ip-strategy-2008/ (noting the existence of “prevalent legal 
protectionism” in China); Andreas Bieberbach, IP Strategies in Business Operations with 
China, 9 J. BUS. CHEM. 161, 161 (2012), available at http://www.businesschemistry.org/
downloads/issues/Issue10-2012.pdf (“[S]ince 1984, . . . Chinese Patent Law has been . . . 
constantly adjusted to the actual needs . . . of . . . Chinese companies.”); Peter K. Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
IN INTELL. PROP. L., at 34 (2007), available at http://www.law.drake.edu/
clinicsCenters/ip/docs/ipResearch-op1.pdf (noting that “[i]n China, the oft-cited barriers to 
intellectual property reforms include . . . widespread corruption, abuse by government 
officials, different values placed on intellectual property infringement, . . . local 
protectionism, and the decentralization of government.”). 
11
 See Teresa Stanek Rea, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property, Remarks at the Fordham Law School China Event (Jan. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2013/rea_fordham_china.jsp (“This massive growth 
presents unique problems for U.S. rights holders, who have complained about patent 
quality . . . . [C]ompanies that have filed for patent protection of pharmaceutical 
compounds at SIPO have had their applications denied, while corresponding patent 
applications in other patent offices, such as the Japan Patent Office, the Korean IP Office, 
the European patent office, and others, have been granted. That is troublesome.”); Lara 
Farrar, Can China Become an Intellectual Property Powerhouse?, CNN, Feb. 15, 2011, 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/02/14/china.intellectual.property/ 
(“‘[The Chinese] say that if you don’t come to China to file, you cannot accuse us of not 
respecting your own intellectual property because you don’t even care to go to the Chinese 
patent office.’” (quoting Tony Chen, a partner in Jones Day’s Shanghai office)).  For an 
example of Chinese firms’ desire to shed their reputation for piracy, see Bieberbach, supra, 
at 161-62 (“I don’t mind how much [the accused infringer] pays us. What I care about is 
winning the case.  It will help change the stereotype that it is Chinese companies that are 
always accused in IPR cases.” (quoting Nan Cunhui, Chairman of Chint Group, a Chinese 
electronics company)). 
12
 See Vivek Wadhwa, China Could Game the U.S. in Intellectual Property, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/technology/content/
jan2011/tc2011017_509416.htm (“A vast number of China’s academic papers are 
plagiarized or irrelevant; its government-sponsored patents will be similarly tainted.”); 
Vivek Wadhwa, Let’s Compete on Innovation Rather Than Patents, TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 15, 
2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/15/lets-compete-on-innovation/ (recounting an 
anecdote about a Chinese supplier patenting its foreign customers’ technology). 
13
 See Chris Neumeyer, China’s Great Leap Forward in Patents, IPWATCHDOG, Apr. 
4, 2013, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/
id=38625/ (summarizing these suits). 
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Siri, videotelephony service FaceTime, and aspects of the famously sleek 
designs of the iPod, iPad, and iPhone.
14
  Other household names, including 
Canon, Dell, Philips, Samsung, and Sony, have also been sued, losing 
multi-million dollar verdicts in some instances.
15
 
Second, many contend that foreign companies cannot get a fair shake in 
the Chinese judicial system and, thus, it would be a Sisyphean endeavor for 
Western technology companies to engage the Chinese patent system as a 
means of deterring infringement.
16
  Warnings about “local protectionism,” 
“bias,” “corruption,” and “lack of impartiality”—especially in China’s 
inland provinces—are ubiquitous and go virtually unchallenged at the 
highest levels of government, the legal profession, and academia.
17
  
However, given how strident and commonplace assertions like these 
are, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists to support or refute them.  
Despite the meteoric rise of patent activity in China—and an apparent 
commitment by the Chinese government to sustain that growth well into the 
                                                 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 See Rea, supra note 11 (“[R]ight holders continue to complain about China’s civil 
judicial enforcement system . . . . We have also heard about many cases of decisions being 
made based on local protectionism and bias towards local companies . . . .”); TINA E. 
HULSE, ET AL., FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, BUILDING 
ASSETS TODAY FOR BUSINESS TOMORROW (2008), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/
articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=344b7049-cc9f-43c3-99cd-daedb90a9d01 
(“[E]nforcement may sound appealing at first, but these procedures sometimes suffer from 
local protectionism and inadequate government resources. . . .”); Benjamin Bai, Ignore At 
Your Own Peril: Intellectual Property (IP) Strategies for China, MARSH INSIGHTS: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2010), available at http://www.jonesday.com/
files/Publication/8f265dea-89c0-408d-8b27-cc7a9b384340/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/5d0c3d30-1af4-4436-b6ee-d4fc5eea8768/Intellectual%20Property%20Update
%20(Issue%202).pdf (“[M]any multinational companies are reluctant to enforce their IP in 
China due to the perceived lack of impartiality.”); DEANNA WONG, ET AL., HOGAN 
LOVELLS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 6, 8 (2012), http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/3126b99b-33d1-
48a8-889e-6b3eaa821235/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d9ef5385-40bb-4fd0-99c5-
6bf1ffd97cf4/Client_Note_Intellectual_Property_Enforcement_in_China_Challenges_and_
Opportunitie.PDF (noting that “local protectionism is still prevalent in China, as is 
corruption” and that “[s]ometimes local protectionism also enables losing parties to delay 
payment for years”); Bieberbach, supra note 10, at 164 (“It is a ‘common understanding’ . . 
. that western companies cannot enforce their IP rights in China because of the weak legal 
system in China.”); Richard P. Suttmeier & Xiangkui Yao, China’s IP Transition: 
Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China, Nat’l Bureau of Asian Res. 
(2011), available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=520  (noting that 
“[m]any foreign companies have been reluctant to pursue their rights in the Chinese legal 
setting . . . .”). 
17
 Id. 
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future—Western scholars have paid little attention.  Though a small number 
of scholars (including two of us) have begun to analyze Chinese ﬁrm-level 
innovation,
18
 empirical study of Chinese patent enforcement is virtually 
nonexistent.
19
   
This Article aims to fill this gap in the literature by presenting the 
findings of the first large-scale empirical study of patent litigation in China.  
Among other things, we find evidence that Chinese patent litigation is 
highly concentrated in a few large jurisdictions and has rates of success and 
of appeal very similar to those seen in the United States.
20
  Most 
importantly, we also find evidence that contradicts conventional wisdom 
about China’s motivations for establishing, and efforts to implement, the 
National IP Strategy.  Though many suggest China set out to create a 
system that would benefit domestic industry at the expense of foreign firms, 
our findings suggest that the system has accomplished the opposite.   
Contrary to conventional wisdom and high-profile anecdotes, foreign 
litigants in Chinese patent suits play the role of patentee more often than 
defendant and fare just as well in their suits as privately owned Chinese 
firms.
21
  Moreover, state-owned monopolies—parties the Chinese 
government presumably has the greatest incentive to protect—rarely sue 
and, when sued, lose a significant share of their cases.
22
 
On the whole, our findings suggest that the Western technology 
community may have been too quick to write off the Chinese patent system 
as a rigged game.  To the extent that Chinese authorities sought to establish 
a protectionist system, they appear to be failing.  Rather, they seem to have 
opened the door for foreign innovators to seek redress against local 
copyists.  Industries that have long accused Chinese firms of idea theft may 
be well advised to take a peek inside.
23
 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Chinese patent 
litigation system.  Part II describes our data collection methodology.  Part 
III describes our findings, divided into jurisdiction-, litigant-, and patent-
specific findings.  Finally, Part IV assesses what our findings suggest about 
                                                 
18
 See Eberhardt, et al., supra note 5.  
19
 But cf. Shenping Yang, Patent Enforcement in China, 4 LANDSLIDE 49 (2011) 
(reporting a few statistics for 3,000 concluded patent trials, presumably including those 
enforcing all three types of patents, reported on the Supreme People’s Court’s website), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/landslide_
november_2011/yang_landslide_novedec_2011.authcheckdam.pdf. 
20
 See infra Part III.A. 
21
 See infra Part III.B. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Limitations to our study include a lack of data on settled cases and a lack of data on 
cases litigated after 2011.  For more discussion of these limitations, see infra Part IV. 
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the state of patent enforcement in China, with a particular focus on whether 
the National IP Strategy has lived up to its architects’ expectations. 
 
I. PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 
 
With almost a million patent applications filed in China last year, it is 
hard to believe that the nation had no patent system until 1985.  Originally 
passed by the National People’s Congress in 1984, the “Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” has been amended three times—most recently 
in 2008—and is supplemented by, among other sources, regulations 
promulgated by the State Council and guidelines, measures, and 
“interpretations” issued by the Supreme People’s Court of China.24  
Because China is a civil law jurisdiction, however, decisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court (and all other courts for that matter) in individual 
cases have little direct effect on Chinese patent law.
25
  
Claims of infringement can be pursued and defended both 
administratively and judicially.  In the administrative system, challenges to 
the validity of issued patents are handled by SIPO’s Patent Review and 
Adjudication Board (PRAB).
26
  In fact, because Chinese patent suits are 
limited to the issue of infringement, the PRAB is the sole venue of first 
instance for validity challenges.
27
  Allegations of infringement can also be 
brought to the attention of local branches of SIPO, which are authorized to 
“order the infringer to stop the infringing act” but are unable to award 
monetary damages.
28
  If SIPO finds infringement or invalidity, its decision 
                                                 
24
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 3, 7-8, 11-12 (2011); Yang, supra note 9, at 51-53.  In 
addition, China ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994, The PCT Now Has 148 
Contracting States, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct_
contracting_states.html (last accessed Aug. 25, 2015), and the TRIPS Agreement in 2001, 
China and the WTO, World Trade Org., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
countries_e/china_e.htm (last accessed Aug. 25, 2015). 
25
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 10. 
26
 Id. at 13. 
27
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 13.  Thus, in this sense, China has a bifurcated system like 
that in effect in Germany, which separates infringement and patent validity.  See Katrin 
Cremers et al., Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent 
Litigation System, Working Paper (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2504507 (discussing Germany’s bifurcated patent enforcement system). 
28
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 21-22; Yang, supra note 19, at 50.  SIPO can, however, 
help the parties mediate a monetary settlement. Id. at 22, 25-26.  A patentee can also 
enforce its rights outside of court via the General Administration of Customs (GAC), which 
has the power to seize infringing imports and exports.  CLARK, supra note 1, at 27-28; 
Yang, supra note 19, at 51. 
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can be—and frequently is—appealed to the court system.29  As a result, 
most serious cases eventually wind up in court. 
With the exception of appeals from the PRAB, Chinese courts are 
restricted to deciding the issue of infringement.
30
  Chinese patent suits 
involve relatively little discovery
31
 and proceed quickly, generally reaching 
a decision on the merits six to eighteen months after filing.
32
  In cases where 
infringement is shown, courts have broad power to award remedies, 
including damages and both pre-trial and permanent injunctions.
33
   
When infringement litigation proceeds in parallel with an administrative 
validity challenge, courts may stay the case pending a ruling by the PRAB 
but are not legally required to do so.
34
  Because validity proceedings usually 
take longer than infringement suits, it is possible that a court will find 
infringement of a patent that is later deemed invalid.
35
 
Judgments from lower courts can be appealed up through the Chinese 
court system, which consists of four levels: Basic People’s Courts, located 
in smaller cities and suburbs; Intermediate People’s Courts, located in major 
cities; High People’s Courts, located in each province, autonomous region, 
and directly controlled city; and the Supreme People’s Court located in 
Beijing.
36
  Patent suits—both infringement suits and appeals from PRAB—
generally begin in an Intermediate People’s Court, though infringement 
cases with sufficiently large amounts at stake may be filed in the first 
                                                 
29
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 21. 
30
 Appeals from PRAB are dealt with by the Beijing Fist Intermediate Court and can 
then go to the Beijing Higher People’s Court.  Id. at 29. 
31
 Id. at 105 (“[O]btaining evidence to prove infringement . . . . can be very difficult as 
the Chinese court system only provides for very limited discovery [and] [t]here is no 
[automatic] obligation on the parties involved in the litigation to disclose any information . 
. . .). 
32
 See Yang, supra note 19, at 51 (“The normal term of a first instance [patent] case is 
six months.  In practice, once sued for infringing a patent, the defendant usually launches 
an invalidation process . . . [that] usually takes one year . . . . Therefore, a patent 
infringement litigation case in China generally takes 18 months.”). 
33
 CLARK, supra note 1, at 97-98, 151-52; see also ALAN J. COX & KRISTINA SEPETYS, 
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CHINA: 
TRENDS IN LITIGATION AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES (2009) (studying damages awarded by 
Chinese courts in a sample of 179 IP cases between 2002-2008, including 20 patent suits). 
The Patent Law does not mention declarations of non-infringement as a potential remedy in 
patent suits, but a 2010 interpretation by the Supreme Court permits declaratory judgment 
actions when the patentee has sent a demand letter.  CLARK, supra, at 100-01.  
34
 CLARK, supra, at 102. 
35
 A similar situation arises often in Germany.  See Cremers et al., supra note 27, at 3 
(estimating that 12 percent of German patent suits result in a finding of infringement of a 
patent that is later invalidated by the Federal Patent Court). 
36
 CLARK, supra, at 16-17, 85. 
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instance in a Higher People’s Court.37  The Supreme Court, all Higher 
Courts, and many Intermediate Courts (at least seventy-six to date) have 
established divisions that specialize in IP cases, including patent suits.
38
 
 
II. STUDY DESIGN 
 
To learn more about patent litigation in China, we set out to identify a 
large sample of patent suits litigated in recent years and collect data on the 
courts, litigants, and patents involved.  This Part describes our data 
collection methodology. 
 
A.  Compiling a Database of Patent Suits 
 
Though the number of patent suits filed in China has exploded in recent 
years, little information about Chinese patent litigation is publicly available.  
Chinese courts do not regularly digitize filings and orders, let alone make 
them publicly accessible online, so those interested in collecting litigation 
data generally must hand-collect hard copy files directly from local 
courthouses and accumulate them for analysis.  
The largest existing database of Chinese court records related to IP 
enforcement is the “China IP Litigation Analysis” database (CIELA) 
created by the law firm Rouse.
39
  This source includes all Chinese IP suits 
litigated to at least one decision issued by one of fifty courts with the most 
active IP dockets in China, as well as all PRAB challenges proceeding in 
parallel with those suits.
40
 
To assist in executing this study, Rouse graciously provided access to 
CIELA data on all IP suits with a decision issued between 2006 and 2011.  
Of these suits, we were able to identify 471 that included at least one claim 
for patent infringement.
41
 
 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 94.  Patent cases in China must be filed in the jurisdiction of a defendant's 
residence or where the infringing act occurred.  Id. at 93. If more than one court has 
jurisdiction, the patentee can select among them. Id. 
38
 Id. at 94.   
39
CIELA, http://www.ciela.cn/ (last accessed Aug. 26, 2015). 
40
 The database covers the decisions of fifty “major IP courts” across thirty-one cities 
and twelve provinces.  Id. To be clear, some suits were appealed to one of these courts, 
rather than filed there. To our knowledge, there is no publicly available data on Chinese 
suits that settled without generating at least one court decision.  Thus, a limitation of our 
study is that we cannot observe the quantity or character of settled patent suits. 
41
 Again, “patent” refers to “invention patent.”  See supra note 1. 
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B.  Litigant- and Patent-Specific Data 
 
For each of these 471 patent suits, we gathered a variety of data relating 
to the suit’s outcome and the parties and patents involved.  First, for each 
suit, we identified all litigating parties.
42
  For each litigating entity, we 
identified the location of its principal place of business, the industry in 
which it operates, and whether it is a privately or state-owned entity.  We 
accumulated this firm-level data from a number of sources, including the 
Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, and the Oriana and Qin 
databases, which contain financial information for over 400,000 companies 
registered in China.
43
  Finally, for each suit, we identified the case’s 
outcome, including whether the case was appealed and, if so, whether the 
ruling was affirmed or reversed.   
Next, for each patent-in-suit, we identified the patent’s priority date,44 
technology classifications,
45
 and, for patents with international counterparts, 
the country where the application was initially filed.
46
   
 
III. FINDINGS  
 
In this Part, we report our findings with respect to patent litigation filed 
in China.  We do so by presenting the data broken down by jurisdiction and 
by the characteristics of the litigants and patents involved in each suit. 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Party names were provided to us in Chinese characters, which we 
translated/transcribed using translation software. 
43
 Oriana, Bureau van Dijk, http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-
information/international-products/oriana (last accessed Aug. 25, 2015).  Qin is now 
exclusively available as part of the larger Orbis database.  Orbis, Bureau van Dijk, 
https://orbis.bvdinfo.com/version-2015819/home.serv?product=orbisneo (last accessed 
Aug. 25, 2015). 
44
 As in the United States, the priority date for a Chinese patent is the filing date of 
the patent’s application or of the earliest relevant parent application to which it claims 
priority. Compare CLARK, supra note 1, at 33-34 with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
45
 Specifically, we identified the patent’s International Patent Classification number. 
See International Patent Classification (IPC) Official Publication, World Intell. Prop. Org., 
http://web2.wipo.int/ipcpub/ (last accessed Aug. 20, 2015). 
46
 China has been a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) since 1994.  See 
supra note 24.  Using procedures established by the PCT, a patent applicant can file a fist 
application with a particular patent office and, within one year, file a second “international” 
application to pursue patent rights in other nations that are PCT members. See MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1842 (9th ed., 2014). 
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A.  By Jurisdiction 
 
Viewing the data first across jurisdictions, we observe that Chinese 
patent litigation varies greatly by city in some respects and yet, in others, is 
quite consistent.  For one, we find that cases are highly concentrated in a 
small number of jurisdictions (Figure 1).
47
  Beijing alone is home to more 
than a quarter of all patent suits in our database,
48
 and the majority of cases 
take place in one of China’s three largest cities.49  As a result, only twenty-
two of the fifty most active IP courts issued at least one patent decision per 
year during the period of our study. 
 
Figure 1: Case Distribution by Jurisdiction 
 
Notes: Size of bubbles corresponds to number of cases in each location. The total number 
of cases displayed is 471. For case counts by location see Table 1. 
  
                                                 
47
 The statistics reported for each jurisdiction include all cases in the database that 
were decided by courts located in that jurisdiction. 
48
 Not even the infamous US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas can tout 
this level of concentration during the same time period.  Lex Machina, Patent Cases Filed 
by Year, https://law.lexmachina.com/court/table#Patent-tab (last accessed Aug. 25, 2015) 
(showing that, between 2005 and mid-2015, the Eastern District of Texas saw about one 
quarter of all US patent suits filed in the top twenty most popular districts). 
49
 Again, to be clear, the data does not include settlement data, so we cannot accurately 
assess how many patent cases were filed in these courts.  See supra note 23. 
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Table 1: Case Counts, Appeals, and Outcomes by Jurisdiction 
            
Rank Jurisdiction No. Cases % Appealed 
Final Outcome 
% Infringed % Not Infringed 
1 Beijing 123 63% 46% 54% 
2 Guangzhou 88 84% 56% 44% 
3 Shanghai 55 58% 73% 27% 
4 Nanjing 31 74% 61% 39% 
5 Changsha 28 14% 82% 18% 
6 Hangzhou 22 64% 64% 36% 
7 Chongqing 18 78% 67% 33% 
8 Zhengzhou 15 40% 53% 47% 
9 Fuzhou 10 50% 60% 40% 
10 Ji'nan 10 90% 40% 60% 
11 Kunming 10 40% 80% 20% 
12 Chengdu 9 67% 44% 56% 
13 Hefei 9 56% 44% 56% 
14 Ningbo 9 33% 78% 22% 
15 Shenyang 7 0% 43% 57% 
 
Other 27 19% 63% 37% 
 
Moreover, we find that cases are clustered by technology (Table 2).  
Each of the three most active jurisdictions sees a disproportionately large 
share of patent suits involving technologies in one or more industries.  The 
majority of all Chinese patent suits related to both information technology 
and pharmaceuticals are filed in Beijing.  Shanghai is even more 
specialized, with almost 60 percent of all patent suits related to automotive 
technology.  Similarly, Guangzhou plays host to half of all patent suits 
related to entertainment technology, a category that includes the toy 
industry.  Patent suits in the United States, by contrast, are not nearly as 
clustered by industry, due in large measure to permissive venue rules that 
draw many filings to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions located far from the 
geographic areas where industries themselves tend to be grouped.
50
 
Despite this variation, however, three other data points appear relatively 
constant across courts: success rates, appeal rates, and remedies (Table 1).  
                                                 
50
 See Jeanne C. Frommer, Patentography, 85 NYU L. REV. 1444, 1449, 1502, 1512, 
1514, 1516 (2010) (finding that, among US district courts, none saw more than roughly 15 
percent of any one of five broad technology classes and arguing that venue rules should be 
changed to facilitate the industry-by-industry clustering of US patent suits in order to take 
advantage of local expertise and court specialization). 
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In eight of the ten courts that issued at least two decisions per year, success 
rates were between 40 and 70 percent, a smaller spread than that seen 
among US district courts.
51
  Similarly, rates of appeal in six of the top seven 
jurisdictions fall between about 60 and 80 percent, rates that again are 
roughly similar to those seen in US patent suits.
52
  Moreover, remedies are 
quite consistent across courts (Table 3).  Seven of the top eight jurisdictions 
have an injunction grant rate of roughly 90 to 100 percent and a median 
damages award between 80,000 and 150,000 RMB. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 407-09 
(2010) (reporting that patentee win rates in US district courts varied between roughly fifty-
6 percent and 12 percent among district with at least twenty-five decisions between 2000 
and 2010). 
52
 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY (2014) (reporting 
that between 2007 and 2011 “appeals were lodged in over 70% of reviewed cases that 
reached an initial conclusion at the district court”), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-
litigation-study.pdf. 
  
 
Table 2: Share of Cases by Industry and Jurisdiction 
                      
Industry 
 
Beijing Changsha Chongqing Guangzhou Hangzhou Nanjing Shanghai Zhengzhou Other 
Total 
Cases 
No. Cases in 
Jurisdiction 
123 28 18 88 22 31 55 15 91 471 
Apparel &  
    Textiles 
14% 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% 29% 0% 43% 21 
Automotive 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 63% 0% 25% 8 
Chemicals &  
    Biotech 
18% 3% 3% 15% 0% 12% 12% 18% 21% 34 
Entertainment 0% 10% 0% 50% 10% 20% 0% 0% 10% 10 
Food &  
   Beverage 
27% 0% 0% 7% 13% 7% 0% 7% 40% 15 
Healthcare 40% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 10 
IT & Services 57% 0% 7% 14% 0% 0% 7% 0% 14% 14 
Manufacturing &  
    Machinery 
24% 8% 5% 23% 5% 6% 11% 3% 17% 320 
Others 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2 
Pharmaceuticals 59% 4% 4% 4% 0% 7% 4% 0% 19% 27 
Publishing &  
    Printing 
0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 20% 0% 40% 5 
Sports &  
    Recreation 
80% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 5 
 
 
Table 3: Remedies Awarded by Jurisdiction 
Notes: Amounts in RMB 1,000; Remedies data is unavailable for two suits. 
 
B.  By Litigant Characteristics 
 
Turning to the litigants in our cases, we find that they are diverse—both 
geographically and classified by industry—and yet nonetheless fare 
consistently well in court decisions across these classifications. 
First, we find that, while Chinese patent cases are highly concentrated in 
a small number of cities, litigants themselves are not (Figure 2).  Almost 
half of all litigants accused of infringement hail from outside the largest five 
jurisdictions, as do the largest share of patentees.   
Also, while individual industries tend to cluster in individual courts, 
litigants as a whole represent a diverse array of market sectors (Table 4).  
Though companies in the mechanical engineering industry constitute the 
vast majority of litigants, firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical, and textile 
industries also make up a sizeable minority. 
 
  
                
Jurisdiction 
 
 
Permanent Injunctions Damages Awarded Costs Awarded 
No. 
Cases  
  
Requests Granted Mean Median Mean Median 
Beijing 57 93% 89% 611.2 150 8.7 0.4 
Changsha 23 70% 65% 283.2 48 1.8 0 
Chongqing 12 100% 100% 366.7 100 0 0 
Guangzhou 49 100% 90% 114.2 100 2.6 0 
Hangzhou 14 100% 93% 153.0 150 5.6 1.2 
Nanjing 19 100% 89% 263.9 95 7.0 0 
Shanghai 39 100% 100% 146.0 100 16.2 0 
Zhengzhou 8 100% 100% 82.5 50 0 0 
Other 53 100% 92% 1241.6 100 2.6 0 
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Figure 2: Litigants Categorized by Origin 
 
 
 
Table 4: Case Distribution by Industry and Owner Type 
 
 
Industry Ownership Type 
 
  HMT Foreign 
Domestic 
Private 
Domestic 
State Total 
Apparel & Textiles 0 4 20 0 24 
Automotive 0 1 7 1 9 
Chemicals & Biotech 0 5 26 0 31 
Entertainment 2 3 10 0 15 
Food & Beverage 0 2 14 0 16 
Healthcare 0 2 10 1 13 
IT & Services 0 1 14 0 15 
Mechanical Engineering 6 41 307 12 366 
Others 0 0 2 0 2 
Pharmaceuticals 0 8 26 1 35 
Publishing & Printing 0 0 5 0 5 
Sports & Recreation 0 0 5 0 5 
Total 8 67 446 15 536 
Notes: HMT represents Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
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Moreover, we find a substantial number of foreign entities engaged in 
Chinese patent enforcement (Table 5).  Though domestic patentees filed the 
overwhelming majority of suits in our database, foreign patentees initiated 
more than 10 percent of cases.  In fact, foreign entities appear in the data 
more often as patentees than accused infringers.  Foreign parties filed suit 
forty-nine times, winning thirty-five of them, and were sued just twenty-
nine times.  By contrast, state-owned Chinese entities—often singled out as 
the intended beneficiary of the Chinese protectionism
56—filed just one suit 
in our database.  State-owned companies were accused of infringement 
much more often—fourteen times—and lost three of those suits. 
Finally, remedies awarded in the suits in the database are surprisingly 
consistent across litigant types (Table 6).  Successful foreign patentees 
received a median damages award of 100,000 RMB in suits against private 
Chinese firms, exactly the same amount that private Chinese patentees 
received when they sued private domestic parties.  Interestingly, Chinese 
patentees received 20 percent less in suits against foreign companies and 60 
percent more in suits against state monopolies.  Similarly, foreign patentees 
received a permanent injunction in every case they won, while victorious 
domestic patentees were denied injunctions 5 to 10 percent of the time.   
                                                 
56
 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 5 (“Lawsuits brought against infringers where the 
alleged infringer is a state-owned enterprise can be especially problematic. State-owned 
enterprises usually have close relationships with local governments at the place where the 
enterprises are located.”); MCGREGOR, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
Table 5: Case Outcomes by Litigant Type 
 
Defendant 
Foreign Domestic Private Domestic State-Owned HMT 
Infringement 
Found 
No 
Infringement 
Infringement 
Found 
No 
Infringement 
Infringement 
Found 
No 
Infringement 
Infringement 
Found 
No 
Infringement 
P
la
in
ti
ff
 
Foreign 
Infringement Found 80% (4)   70% (31)   -   -   
No Infringement   20% (1)   31% (13)   -   - 
Domestic 
Private 
Infringement Found 67% (16)   57% (224)   27% (3)   -   
No Infringement   33% (8)   43% (168)   73% (11)   100% (3) 
Domestic State-
Owned 
Infringement Found -   100% (1)   -   -   
No Infringement   -   -   -   - 
HMT 
Infringement Found -   100% (5)   -   -   
No Infringement   -   -   -   - 
Notes: HMT represents  Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
        
Table 6: Remedies by Foreign and Domestic Litigants 
 
Foreign Domestic Private Domestic State-Owned 
 Injunction Damages  Injunction Damages  Injunction Damages 
No. Cases 
Inf. Found 
Requested 
(Req’d) 
Awarded Req’d Awarded 
No. Cases 
Inf. Found 
Req’d Awarded Req’d Awarded 
No. Cases 
Inf. Found 
Req’d Awarded Req’d Awarded 
P
la
in
ti
ff
 
Foreign 4 100% 100% 
Mean:  
262.5 
Median:  
200 
Mean:  
112.5 
Median:  
100 
31 100% 100% 
Mean: 
1014.51 
Median: 
250 
Mean: 
440.94 
Median:  
100 
- - - - - 
Domestic 
Private 
16 100% 94% 
Mean:  
1278.13 
Median: 
475 
Mean:  
386.94 
Median:  
80.5 
222 95% 89% 
Mean: 
1284.65 
Median:  
300 
Mean: 
539.56 
Median:  
100 
3 67% 67% 
Mean: 
1299.14 
Median: 
300 
Mean: 
119.84 
Median: 
160 
Domestic 
State-
Owned 
- - - - - 1 100% 100% 
Mean: 
100 
Median: 
100 
Mean:  
100  
Median:  
100 
- - - - - 
 HMT - - - - - 5 100% 100% 
Mean: 
420 
Median: 
500 
Mean: 
320 
Median: 
500 
- - - - - 
Notes: Amounts in RMB 1,000; Remedies data is unavailable for two suits between private domestic litigants; Infringement was not proven in any of the three suits filed against litigants from Hong Kong, Macao, or 
Taiwan 
C.  By Patent Characteristics 
 
Looking next at the individual patents asserted in our database, we find 
them to be relatively international in origin, relatively old when asserted, 
and disproportionately related to mechanical and chemical inventions.  In 
addition, we see that surprisingly few faced a validity challenge. 
First, almost 30 percent of patents litigated in Chinese courts were 
issued from applications initially filed in Europe, Japan, or the United States 
(Figure 3).  Another 4 percent, though originally filed in China, were 
subsequently filed in other countries and have foreign counterparts issued 
from patent offices located elsewhere in the world. 
 
Figure 3: Priority Filings by Country 
 
 
Note: CA: Canada; CN: China; EU: European Union; JP: Japan; KR: Korea; US: United States.  
 
Also, we observe that litigated patents are, on the whole, roughly 
middle-aged, with a similar age distribution among patents asserted by both 
foreign and domestic patentees.  Only about 10 percent of patents litigated 
in Chinese courts were asserted within five years of their priority date 
(Figure 4).
57
  Approximately 42 percent, by contrast, were filed more than a 
                                                 
57
 Patent applications pend, on average, between two and three years at SIPO before 
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decade before they were enforced in court. 
 
Figure 4: Patent Age at Time of Litigation 
 
 
We additionally find that, consistent with the industry distribution 
reported above, patents enforced by both foreign and domestic parties 
mostly cover inventions related to the mechanical and chemical arts.  By 
comparison, US patent suits predominantly involve electrical and computer-
related technology.
58
 
Lastly, we find that a surprisingly small number of asserted patents 
faced a parallel validity challenge.  Overall, less than 14 percent of patents 
were challenged in a PRAB proceeding (Table 7).  By contrast, virtually 
every patent asserted in the United States faces a validity challenge in 
court.
59
  Even relative to other jurisdictions that bifurcate consideration of 
                                                                                                                            
they are granted. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENTS 39 (2014), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/wipi/2014/pdf/wipi_2014_patents.pdf 
(showing that patent pendency at SIPO decreased significantly from 2002 to 2010); Mark 
Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 498 (2012) (same). 
58
 See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a 
Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1342- 44(2014) (finding that over 40 percent of litigated patent issued in the early 
1990s cover “high tech” inventions). 
59
 See Mark A. Lemely, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
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validity and infringement—a procedural choice correlated with fewer 
validity challenges—this is a relatively low rate of challenge.60 
 
Figure 5: Litigated Patents by Technology 
 
Table 7: Validity Challenges by Nationality of Litigants 
                  
 
Validity Challenged by Defendant? 
Plaintiff Defendant Foreign Defendant Domestic 
 
No Yes No Yes 
  
No. 
cases % 
No. 
cases % 
No. 
cases % 
No. 
cases % 
Foreign 4 80% 1 20% 17 94% 1 6% 
Domestic 15 83% 3 17% 162 86% 27 14% 
Notes: We were able to obtain data on parallel validity challenged for only 230 cases. 
 
                                                                                                                            
1495, 1502 (2001) (“Virtually every patent infringement lawsuit includes a claim that the 
patent is either invalid or unenforceable due to inequitable conduct (or commonly both).”). 
60
 See Cremers et al., supra note 27, at 3 (finding that “bifurcation reduces the 
likelihood that an alleged infringer challenges a patent’s validity . . . . in particular [for] 
smaller firms . . . .”). 
23-Feb-16] Patent Litigation in China 23 
III. ANALYSIS  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that Chinese patent litigation is not rife 
with protectionism.  To the contrary, they suggest that foreign companies 
perform as well, if not better, than Chinese firms in patent suits. 
First, the case-level data suggests that patent suits are rarely litigated in 
smaller inland cities where, conventional wisdom holds, protectionism is 
most often encountered.
61
  For one, our data indicates that patent litigation 
is overwhelmingly a big-city phenomenon in China and, even among major 
metropolitan areas, is largely concentrated in just a few of the nation’s 
largest cities.  Moreover, even when foreign companies are sued outside 
large cities, our data suggests that it is relatively easy to move cases to 
urban jurisdictions using the appeals process.  As our findings show, the 
rate of appeal among Chinese patent suits is high, perhaps because Chinese 
patent suits are fast enough and cheap enough to make appeal a realistic 
option for most parties.
62
  Last, large urban jurisdictions, particularly 
Beijing and Guangzhou, seem to be the overwhelming venues of choice for 
cases involving pharmaceuticals and information technology—the 
technologies most often cited as targets of Chinese protectionism.
63
  
Together, these findings suggest that, even if protectionism is common 
outside large cities, foreign patent litigants are not likely to face suit, let 
alone a final court decision, in those jurisdictions.
64
    
Second, our observations about litigating parties also tend to suggest 
                                                 
61
 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 4-5 (“In large cities, [protectionism] is usually not 
a serious concern. In smaller cities, however, the local government will have strong 
incentives to protect any opposing party that is a large employer of workers, and/or a large 
source of tax revenue.”); HULSE, ET AL., supra note 16 (“[T]o the extent possible, IP 
owners should file civil actions in the highest court possible in areas most experienced in 
handling infringement cases, such as Beijing for patents or Shanghai for trademarks.”); 
Bieberbach, supra note 10 (“To avoid local protectionism and have the case handled by an 
IP experienced court, the choice of the right court is important (Beijing or Shanghai are 
recommended).”). 
62
 Bifurcation of invalidity and infringement likely also creates an incentive for appeal.  
See Cremers et al., supra note 27, at 11 (explaining that the German bifurcated system 
incentivizes the appeal of infringement findings to delay their finality until the Federal 
Patent Court can decide the issue of validity). 
63
 See, e.g., Rea, supra note 11 (pointing to pharmaceuticals in particular); 
MCGREGOR, supra note 10. 
64
 Indeed, even domestic patentees appear to favor urban jurisdictions when filing 
patent suits.  As discussed above in Part III.A, a large percentage of patent cases litigated in 
large urban jurisdictions are filed by domestic parties from outside those cities jurisdiction.  
The fact that these parties very likely could have filed suit in their home jurisdiction, but 
chose not to, suggests that even Chinese litigants generally prefer large urban jurisdictions 
to smaller inland ones, despite the supposed benefits of local protectionism. 
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that protectionism is not rampant in jurisdictions where patent suits are 
commonly litigated.  Foreign companies are not frequent targets of Chinese 
patent suits and, to the contrary, most often appear in our data as patent 
enforcers, not accused infringers.  Moreover, when foreign companies sue, 
they win relatively frequently and are awarded remedies commensurate 
with those given to domestic patentees.  Chinese companies—especially 
state-owned firms—fare worse on the merits of their cases, both as 
plaintiffs and defendants, and when they sue foreign companies, they 
actually receive less in damages than they do in suits against domestic 
infringers. 
Finally, the characteristics of litigated patents in our database also tend 
to cast doubt on the broader Chinese patent system’s supposed protectionist 
tendencies.  In a system rife with patents that merely copy already-popular 
products, one would expect to see a large population of suits asserted 
newly-minted patents filed exclusively in China.  But the litigated patents in 
our data set are, on the whole, relatively old, and many were issued from 
applications that are part of international patent families.  Just a tiny fraction 
of litigated patents were asserted within five year of their issue date, and 
close to half were more than a decade old at the time of suit.  Moreover, 
about a third have at least one foreign counterpart, which indicates that 
these applications disclosed inventions deemed novel by at least one other 
patent office.  In addition, the most common technology class among 
litigated patents is mechanical engineering, and the most common industry 
classification among litigants is manufacturing.  Electrical engineering 
ranks fourth out of six patent categories, and information technology ranks 
sixth on the list of represented industries.  Thus, though suits against Apple, 
Samsung, and Dell grab headlines in the West, it appears that cases 
involving software and computer technology constitute just a small minority 
of Chinese patent enforcement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, these findings cast doubt on conventional wisdom among 
Western companies and commentators about Chinese patent enforcement.  
While we cannot rule out the existence of blatant protectionism in smaller 
inland courts from which we could not obtain data, patent suits in those 
jurisdictions appear to be rare.  Moreover, while we cannot observe 
settlement behavior or correct for other possible selection effects,
65
 our 
                                                 
65
 For example, it is possible that foreign tech companies, discouraged by conventional 
wisdom about Chinese courts’ supposed protectionist tendencies, bring suit only when their 
claims are especially strong and, thus, litigate cases that are on average objectively more 
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findings on litigation outcomes bear little evidence of protectionism.  
Foreign patent owners brought over 10 percent of Chinese patent 
infringement actions in our database and won over 70 percent of those 
cases.  By contrast, state-owned entities—presumably those the Chinese 
government has the greatest interest in protecting—filed only one suit in our 
database and lost three of the fourteen suits filed against them.  Lastly, 
while we cannot rule out a rush to file and enforce shoddy patents in more 
recent years, our findings cast doubt on claims that this was a regular 
occurrence prior to 2012.  Rather than a land rush to obtain and enforce 
patent rights in the immediate aftermath of the National IP Strategy’s 
announcement, the vast majority of litigated patents in our database were 
filed before the Strategy was ever announced, and many of those patents 
have family members blessed by other nations’ patent offices. 
Accordingly, our findings tend to suggest that, to the extent Chinese 
leaders hoped that stimulating the national patent system would result in 
widespread protectionism, their hopes were misplaced.  To the contrary, 
they appear to have created a system that often benefits foreign interests at 
the expense of domestic ones and that also generates a good deal of 
litigation among domestic firms.  Technology companies in the United 
States and elsewhere in the world—particularly those that have long 
accused China of piracy—may be well advised to give the Chinese patent 
system a second look.   
Ultimately, however, this study is merely a starting point for analysis of 
Chinese patent litigation and should be viewed as such.  We believe that the 
data presented in this Article is the best empirical information made 
available to date, but we also acknowledge that it is imperfect in several 
respects.  If current trends in China continue, we expect to see the Chinese 
patent system become more and more important to Western companies, law 
firms, and policymakers.  As demand for reliable information in this area 
increases, we expect data collection efforts to expand as well, and we 
encourage future scholars to take advantage of this trend and carry out 
future studies. 
 
                                                                                                                            
meritorious than those filed by domestic patentees.  It is also possible that foreign 
companies that are willing and able to file suit in China (as well as those that are worth 
suing in China) are generally more sophisticated or have deeper pockets than their Chinese 
counterparts and thus, for example, are able to secure more skilled (or well connected) 
legal representation.  Because we lack the data to accurately measure and correct for these 
potential effects, we cannot rule out the possibility that the success rates we observe among 
foreign litigants are, despite their similarity to those of domestic parties, depressed by 
protectionism and, absent that disadvantage, would be significantly higher.   
